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ABSTRACT
The study of civil cases handled by Assistant United States Attorneys
(AUSAs) indicates that use of ADR can be an efficient and effective
procedural solution to the problems of time and cost in the justice system
without sacrificing the quality of macrojustice. When ADR was used, 65% of
cases settled (only 29% of cases settled when it was not used). Significantly
more cases settled when ADR was voluntary than when
it was mandatory (71% vs. 50%), and tort cases settled with more frequency
than employment discrimination cases (73% vs. 60%).
When using ADR, A USAs subjectively estimated that the process saved
significant time and money. A USAs spent an average of $869 in neutral fees
and estimated that the process saved $10,735 in litigation expenses per case.
A USAs spent an average of 12 hours preparing for ADR and 7 hours in the
ADR process per case, which they estimated saved 88 hours of staff time and
6 months of litigation time per case. Analyses of various macrojustice
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outcomes show that ADR outcomes were not significantly different from
litigated outcomes, indicating that the process was neutral, favoring neither
private parties nor the government.
While these statistics are descriptive, a final analysis shows that the
earlier a case is referred to ADR, the shorter its time to disposition. In sum,
the study provides a better picture of how ADR is used by the government in
federal court cases, and suggests that ADR has the potential to improve
dispute processing without sacrificing the quality ofjustice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In A World Without Trials?, Professor Marc Galanter documents a
decline in both the absolute number and rate of civil trials and jury trials in
state and federal courts, a decline that is both long-term over the past century
and precipitous in the past two decades.' Focusing on litigation in the federal
courts, he reports that the percentage of case terminations through civil trial
dropped from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.7% in 2004 despite the fact that by then
there were five times as many cases filed a year.2 The absolute number of
civil trials dropped from 5802 in 1962 to 3951 in 2004. 3 He identifies five
"vanishing trial stories" as hypotheses to explain the phenomenon:
convergence of common law and civil code systems4 ; displacement of trials
to administrative, arbitral, and other dispute resolution mechanisms5 ;
assimilation of trial-like procedures and due process into surrounding
institutions other than courts6 ; transformation of the legal system from a
rational, rule-centered, and formal system into an informal decisional process
entailing negotiation, participation, and interaction7 ; and evolution of an
adversarial process into something different, entailing process pluralism
"intelligently designed" to produce more optimal outcomes. 8
Although Galanter cautions against attributing the decline entirely to
alternative dispute resolutions (ADR), he observes:
While confidence in adjudication and courts has declined, the courts,
politicians, and business elites have embraced "alternative dispute
I Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 7, 13-14 (2006).
2 Id. at 7-8.
3Id.
4 Id. at 23-24.
5 Id. at 24-27.
6 Id. at 27-30.
7 Galanter, supra note 1, at 30-31.
8 Id. at 31-33.
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resolution." Courts have incorporated "alternative" processes like
mediation, early neutral evaluation, arbitration, summary jury trial; they
have engaged in outsourcing to ADR institutions; and doctrinally, they have
enhanced both the power of those institutions and their exclusive
jurisdiction. ADR institutions and programs have proliferated.9
These findings have sparked a vigorous debate on the impact of "the
vanishing trial" on justice in the United States.
One can argue that issues of justice are more salient when the federal
government is a litigant.' 0 The Attorney General, through the Department of
Justice, has final authority to supervise and conduct litigation on behalf of the
United States, including actions to enforce public law or in defense of the
government." These disputes do not simply entail the private interests of
parties to a contract or tort. Even when the government is engaged in civil
litigation involving tort claims, it is acting as an entity empowered by the
public and funded through taxpayer dollars. Thus, the question arises, what
has been the impact of the rise of ADR and decline of trials on the outcomes
of this special sector of litigation?
Advocates argue various ADR techniques are efficient and effective
procedural solutions to managing federal court dockets; 12 however, most
scholars and commentators agree that there is insufficient empirical research
about the efficacy and success of ADR as compared to traditional litigation.13
9 Id. at 17 (citations omitted). For a general history of the rise of ADR in the courts,
see Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 165 (2003). For an
account of the evolution of both community and court programs, and the failure of
entirely private systems to flourish, see Kimberlee K. Kovach, Privatization of Dispute
Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound, but Mission Incomplete: Lessons Learned and a
Possible Blueprint for the Future, 48 S. TEX. L. REv. 1003 (2007).
10 In theory, the government acts on behalf of its citizens under the basic notions of
the social contract embodied in our Constitution. See generally, JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1762), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (last visited April 18, 2009).
1 28 U.S.C. § 515 (2002).
12 See, e.g., James F. Henry, The Courts at a Crossroads: A Consumer Perspective
of the Judicial System, 95 GEO. L.J. 945, 961-64 (2007) (addressing the arguments for
ADR in the federal judicial system).
13 Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research
Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 123 (2002); Deborah R.
Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 71, 74-75 (2000);
Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J.
DISP. RESOL. 81, 95 (2002); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial":
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Even less research exists comparing the use of ADR and litigation when the
federal government is a litigant.
This study examines litigation and ADR when the federal government is
a litigant using a unique dataset of civil cases handled by Assistant U. S.
Attorneys (AUSAs) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) between 1995 and
1998, a period in the middle of the steep decline Galanter reports in civil
trials in the past 20 years. 14 DOJ handles the vast majority of cases in the
federal courts that involve the U.S. government, and the government is
involved in approximately one-third of all civil cases in 'the federal courts. 15
This context provides an excellent opportunity to examine the use of ADR in
the federal government and empirically compare ADR and litigation cases in
trial courts. 16 How does the federal government use ADR in legal actions and
for what kinds of cases? How do ADR cases compare to litigated cases in
terms of macrojustice, which is defined as the overall pattern of outcomes?
Are there substantive differences in outcomes of ADR and litigation cases?
Are there differences in trial rates and disposition times between ADR and
litigation cases? If ADR is used, does the timing of the intervention affect
disposition time?
First, we review the role of ADR in the federal government and explore
issues of macrojustice and dispute processing in ADR and litigation. Second,
we present a descriptive analysis of some characteristics of the litigation and
ADR cases, which helps identify what types of cases receive ADR
interventions. Third, we statistically compare ADR and litigation cases with
respect to monetary outcomes, trial rates, and time to disposition. We also
explore the relationship between the timing of an ADR intervention and the
time to final disposition of the case. We conclude with a discussion about the
implications of these results and suggestions for future research. There are
limitations to our sample, unique and useful as it is. We need to do much
more systematic and rigorous research to understand the impact of dispute
resolution both on the decline in trials and on justice.
The Growth and Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution, " 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 843, 845-48 (2004).
14 Galanter, supra note 1, at 13-14.
15 JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE
UNITED STATES GOvERNMENT 3 (2004).
16 For a discussion of court-connected ADR in the federal appellate courts, see
Shawn P. Davisson, Note, Privatization and Self-Determination in the Circuits: Utilizing
the Private Sector Within the Evolving Framework of Federal Appellate Mediation, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 953 (2006).
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II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Alternative 17 or appropriate 18 dispute resolution (ADR) is an umbrella
term for a wide variety of conflict management techniques and processes
used in lieu of traditional judicial and administrative methods such as
litigation and administrative adjudication. Many ADR processes use a third
party neutral, such as a facilitator, mediator, or arbitrator.19 Professor Robert
Kagan has documented the dramatic growth in adversarial legalism as an
approach to governance from the 1960s to 1980s. 20 ADR use was relatively
sparse in the federal government until the 1990s, when it began to grow in
earnest through a combination of congressional legislation, presidential
proclamations, and Attorney General guidance as a response to a perceived
explosion in litigation or the threat of litigation.21 Although Congress passed
a series of legislative acts incorporating ADR into all three branches of the
federal government, the greatest impacts have been experienced in
administrative agencies and federal courts. 22
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 199023 was watershed
legislation for government ADR.24 This Act and its companion, the
17 See generally JEROME T. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT (2004).
18 Some commentators have used the phrase "appropriate dispute resolution" to
suggest that processes like mediation need not be viewed as alternative to anything. For a
discussion using this terminology, see Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer,
Selecting an Appropriate Dispute Resolution Procedure: Detailed Analysis and
Simplified Solution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 386 (Michael L. Moffitt
& Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005).
19 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act defines alternative means of dispute
resolution as including but not limited to "conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact
finding, minitrials, arbitration, and use of ombuds, or any combination thereof." 5 U.S.C.
§ 571(3) (2008). All of these processes entail the use of a third party who is not one of the
disputants.
20 See generally, ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW (2001).
21 SENGER, supra note 15, at 11-16; Lisa B. Bingham & Charles R. Wise, The
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990: How Do We Evaluate its Success?, 6 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 383,385 (1996).
22 In addition to the Acts affecting the executive and judicial branches, the
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (2008)), instructed legislative agencies to use ADR for
employment disputes.
23 Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583
(2008)).
24 SENGER, supra note 15, at 13.
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Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,25 were permanently reauthorized with
the passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996.26 This Act
requires each federal agency to adopt an ADR policy, designate a senior
official to be its dispute resolution specialist, provide regular training on
ADR, and review each of its contracts, grants, and related agreements and
consider amending them to authorize and encourage the use of ADR.27 In the
Act, Congress noted:
[A]dministrative proceedings have become increasingly formal, costly, and
lengthy resulting in unnecessary expenditures of time and in a decreased
likelihood of achieving consensual resolution of disputes; ... alternative
means of dispute resolution have been used in the private sector for many
years and, in appropriate circumstances, have yielded decisions that are
faster, less expensive, and less contentious;.., such alternative means can
lead to more creative, efficient, and sensible outcomes .... Federal agencies
may not only receive the benefit of techniques that were developed in the
private sector, but may also take the lead in the further development and
refinement of such techniques; and ... the availability of a wide range of
dispute resolution procedures, and an increased understanding of the most
effective use of such procedures, will enhance the operation of the
Government and better serve the public. 2 8
This reasoning is echoed in ADR legislation aimed at the federal court
system.29 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 199030 directed all federal district
courts to implement "a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan"31 and
specifically encouraged the use of ADR programs in this effort.
After several years of experimentation with ADR at the district court
level, 32 Congress passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,33
25 Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969.
26 Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (2008)).
27 5 U.S.C. § 571 (promotion of alternative means of dispute resolution).
28 Id. (congressional findings).
29 Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
United States Federal Courts: Panacea or Pandemic, 81 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 77, 79-88
(2007) (reviewing the evolution of ADR in the federal courts).
30 Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-106, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2007)).
31 28 U.S.C. § 471.
32 See generally, Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Power of the
Federal Courts to Compel Participation in Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (2003) (arguing that federal courts have strong inherent
powers to order parties to participate in nonbinding ADR even in the absence of court
rules or existing court-connected programs).
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which instructs each federal district court to "devise and implement its own
alternative dispute resolution program ... to encourage and promote the use
of alternative dispute resolution in its district, '34 "require that litigants in all
civil cases consider the use of an alternative dispute resolution process at an
appropriate stage in the litigation .... [and] provide litigants in all civil cases
with at least one alternative dispute resolution process. ' 35 The Act authorizes
federal district courts to use a broad range of ADR processes, defined as "any
process or procedure, other than adjudication by a presiding judge, in which
a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of issues in
controversy, through processes such as early neutral evaluation, mediation,
mini-trial, and arbitration. '36 The rationale behind this Act resonates with
that of earlier legislation. Congress asserted that ADR
has the potential to provide a variety of benefits, including greater
satisfaction of the parties, innovative methods of resolving disputes, and
greater efficiency in achieving settlements;... [ADR] may have potential
to reduce the large backlog of cases now pending in some Federal courts
throughout the United States, thereby allowing the courts to process their
remaining cases more efficiently .... 37
Recent presidents have also encouraged ADR in the federal government.
In 1991, President George H. W. Bush issued an executive order stating that
ADR "can contribute to the prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of the
claims. '38 Seven years later, President Bill Clinton issued a memorandum
stating,
As part of an effort to make the Federal Government operate in a more
efficient and effective manner, and to encourage, where possible,
consensual resolution of disputes and issues in controversy involving the
United States, including the prevention and avoidance of disputes, I have
determined that each Federal agency must take steps to ... promote greater
use of mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, agency ombuds, and
other alternative dispute resolution techniques .... 39
33 Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993, 2994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658
(2007)).
34 28 U.S.C. § 651.
3 28 U.S.C. § 652.
36 28 U.S.C. § 651.
37 Id. (findings and declaration of policy).
38 Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,196 (Oct. 25, 1991).
39 Memorandum on Agency Use of Alternate Means of Dispute Resolution and
Negotiated Rulemaking, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 749 (May 1, 1998).
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One tie that binds together these various ADR Acts and presidential
proclamations is the recognition of the strong role played by administrative
agencies in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil justice
system. For example, in the Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress found "[t]he
courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the Congress and the
executive branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil
litigation ... ,"40 This finding inherently acknowledges the fact that the
federal government is the single largest consumer of judiciary services.
However, its suggestion rings particularly true for DOJ, the agency that
handles the vast majority of federal civil litigation cases. There are roughly
10,000 attorneys in DOJ, about half of whom serve as Assistant United
States Attorneys (AUSAs) handling litigation in field offices in every federal
district court in the country.
The Department of Justice was receptive to the push to use ADR.
Attorney General Janet Reno created an Office of Dispute Resolution to
coordinate the use of ADR in DOJ and issued guidance noting:
Our commitment to make greater use of ADR is long overdue. Clearly, our
federal court system is in overload. Delays are all too common, depriving
the public of swift, efficient, and just resolution of disputes. The
Department of Justice is the biggest user of the federal courts and the
nation's most prolific litigator. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those
Department attorneys who handle civil litigation from Washington and
throughout the country to consider alternatives to litigation.
If we are successful, the outcome will benefit litigants by producing better
and quicker results, and will benefit the entire justice system by preserving
the scarce resources of the courts for the disputes that only courts can
decide. 41
This proactive response has led some to assert that the government may be
leading the private sector in the movement to institutionalize ADR.42
40 Pub. L. 101-650, Ch. 1, § 102, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (emphasis added).
41 Department of Justice, Policy on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, and
Case Identification Criteria for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,895 (July
15, 1996).
42 Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. DisP. REsOL. 79, 95 (2000).
For comprehensive information on the use of ADR at the federal agency level, visit the
website of the Federal Interagency ADR Working Group, http://www.adr.gov (last
visited Oct. 16, 2008).
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While ADR has been growing in earnest in the federal government for
the past 15 years, relatively little research has been conducted on its impacts
and effectiveness in the federal court system. Moreover, little research has
explored the intersection of administrative agencies and the courts, especially
in regard to agency discretion to use ADR or pursue litigation and the
impacts of those choices on macrojustice and dispute processing.43 The
involvement of the government as a party increases the importance of these
issues.
III. MACROJUSTICE: COMPARING ADR AND LITIGATION
Claims that ADR can systematically produce outcomes different from
the public justice system represent important questions of public policy not
yet fully addressed. Before we can assess evolving private justice systems,
we need to understand the full dynamics of the shadow in which they
operate. One issue that frames this inquiry is control over the design of the
system.44 This control generally takes one of three forms. First, the
disputants themselves may control the design, as is in the case of grievance
procedures in collective bargaining agreements.45 Second, one party may
have superior economic power and the capacity to impose a system on the
other disputant, as can be the case with adhesive or mandatory arbitration
clauses in employment and consumer disputes.46 Lastly, an authoritative
third party may provide a system for the benefit of disputants; this is the case
with state and federal court-connected ADR programs.47 Arguably, these
programs are more likely to be fair than one-party adhesive designs, because
courts are publicly accountable institutions acting in the public interest.48
Typically, courts have consulted with representatives of the plaintiff and
43 For a discussion of the relationship between Department of Justice litigators and
conflicts with their clients, see Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ
Control of Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1345, 1361-62 (2000)
(addressing conflicts over enforcement litigation); Mark B. Stem & Alisa B. Klein, The
Government's Litigator: Taking Clients Seriously, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1409, 1420-21
(2000) (discussing conflicts over settlement decisions).
44 Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 221, 221-25 (2004).
45 Id. at 225-26.
46 1d. at 231-32.
4 7 Id. at 243.
4 8 Id. at 249.
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defense bar when they design their programs. 49 Thus, court ADR programs
represent a good context for examining issues of macrojustice.
Professor Thomas Main recently observed that ADR represents the new
equity.50 Court-connected ADR provides an opportunity for personal and
individualized justice not bound by the strictures of precedent or the limits on
courts to shape remedies within the law. Just as courts of common law and
equity operated successfully in parallel producing distinct outcomes, so too
can courts and ADR have a dynamic and beneficial relationship. 51
However, some critics have expressed concerns that ADR constitutes a
form of "second class justice" that will undermine the system of precedent
and access to justice and weaken the enforcement of public law. 52 This fear
49 DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990, 219 (1997) available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/0024.pdf/$file/
0024.pdf (referring to advisory group that helped court design an early assessment
program). See also the Planning and Policy Advisory Committee of the Wisconsin Court
System, http://www.wicourts.gov/about/committees/ppac.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2009), which has representatives including members of the bar and nonlawyers and has
worked on an alternative dispute resolution policy. Similarly, the Florida state courts
have created advisory committees related to ADR. See Alternative Dispute Resolution,
http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/adr/brochure.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
50 Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 329 (2005). See also
Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 577 (2006). But
see Kenneth F. Dunham, Is Mediation the New Equity?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 87, 114
(2007).
51 Main, supra note 50, at 389-90.
52 See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 144-46 (1983);
Wayne D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Nonbinding ADR Services?, 16
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LrrIG. 65 (1998); Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years
After Pound: Have We Found A Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93 (2002);
Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 241, 253-54 (2006) (reviewing arguments that court-connected ADR promotes a
"two-tiered system of justice"). But see Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Court-Annexed
Arbitration in Clark County, Nevada: An Evaluation of Its Impact on the Pace, Cost, and
Quality of Civil Justice, 18 JUST. SyS. J. 287, 301 (1996). Professor Judith Resnik
expresses concern about how the growing orientation toward managing litigation and
procedure for settlement, and the accompanying growing federal common law related to
settlement agreements and their enforceability, are undermining due process and access
to adjudication. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593,
594-600 (2005). Resnik has speculated that the proliferation of administrative
adjudication and private dispute resolution may reduce the availability of adjudication
over the next century, and we will lose the capacity for the public to observe and know
how power is deployed in our society. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether
Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1101, 1103 (2006). At the same time, there are calls for
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is heightened by legislative ambiguity; the Civil Justice Reform Act and the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act provide little specific discussion about
the role of ADR in the court system and leave district courts "tremendous
discretion" in designing and implementing ADR processes. 53 The result is
that programs vary widely along a number of dimensions. 54 A recent study
by Professor Lande suggests that court administrators view the
administration of justice broadly and do not see it as encompassed by a
traditional trial to a judge or jury.55 This raises the question how one would
determine when court systems are effectively providing justice, and how we
might define that term. 56
In response to these concerns, some researchers have examined the
overall pattern of outcomes produced by ADR programs and compared these
judges to become activist in the service of settlement, particularly in the context of large,
complex litigation. Eric D. Green, Re-Examining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large,
Complex Litigation: Lessons from Microsoft and Other Megacases, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1171,1171-79(2006).
53 Caroline Harris Crowne, Note, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998:
Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768, 1770 (2001).
54 Ward, supra note 29, at 85 observes:
Even if we examine solely mediation programs, we find tremendous variation
in different courts. Some mediation programs are mandatory; some are voluntary.
Some litigants receive the services of a mediator from the court without cost; some
litigants pay for mediation at market prices or at reduced prices. Some mediators are
court staff; others are volunteers or private providers. Some mediation sessions are
limited to a single short session; others, especially those for which litigants pay, may
continue as needed. Some mediators use evaluative techniques; some mediators
favor facilitative or transformative approaches. Many mediation sessions operate as
settlement conferences. Variations occur among districts, and within districts ... 
Id. (citations omitted).
55 John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts'Roles and
Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements
Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 213, 221-22 (2006). Professor
Moffitt, consistent with this broader view, argues that courts should allow the parties to
customize their litigation by allowing them to negotiate the civil procedure. Michael L.
Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461,464-65 (2007).
56 One judge defined success for ADR programs in New York courts as "effective
outcomes for people rather than merely counting filings and dispositions." Jonathan
Lippman, Achieving Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 814 (2007). For more detailed discussions of justice and
mediation, see Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001).
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with the pattern of outcomes in adjudicated cases. 57 This kind of analysis of
outcome quality is sometimes referred to as macrojustice and can include
issues such as outcomes, trial rates, and time to disposition.58 Outcomes are
often defined as the mean cash recovery or as the percentage of a claim that
the claimant recovers.59 Researchers have approached the issues of
macrojustice using surveys, archival data, and random assignment
experiments. 60
However, researchers are frequently plagued by two major
methodological problems in studying ADR interventions, particularly when
they use surveys and archival data.61 One issue, as demonstrated by
Galanter's research, is that the vast majority of all cases filed as civil
complaints in court settle before reaching trial. Thus, if a case settles after an
ADR intervention, it is difficult to determine whether this is one of the cases
that would have settled absent the intervention or whether it is one of the few
cases that would have consumed more judicial time and resources through a
trial. 62 A second problem stems from selection bias resulting from how and
why cases are selected and assigned to traditional judicial processing versus
to an ADR intervention. Cases that go to mediation or arbitration and cases
that do not are not necessarily comparable because these cases often are
57 SENGER, supra note 15, at 237-238.
58 For reviews of research related to court-connected ADR, see Stipanowich, supra
note 13; Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in
Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 55 (2004).
59 E.g., Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients
Justice?: An Empirical Study of Lawyers'Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2006) (defining as the proportion of the tax at issue
recovered by the IRS and finding that "attorneys obtain significantly better results in tried
cases than unrepresented taxpayers do-and that the magnitude of that effect increases
with greater attorney experience-but, surprisingly, that attorneys do not obtain better
outcomes in settled cases").
60 See, Ralph Peeples et al., Following the Script: An Empirical Analysis of Court-
Ordered Mediation of Medical Malpractice Cases, 2007 J. Disp. RESOL. 101, 103 (2007)
(observing that most research is based on surveys of mediators, parties, and their lawyers,
and reporting the results of a rare observational study of mediated medical malpractice
cases in North Carolina courts).
61 For an excellent overview of these issues, see JENNIFER E. SHACK, BIBLIOGRAPHIC
SUMMARY OF COST, PACE, AND SATISFACTION STUDIES OF COURT-RELATED MEDIATION
PROGRAMS (2d ed. 2007), available at
http://courtadr.org/files/MedStudyBiblio2ndEd2.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
62 See, e.g., STEVEN HARTWELL & GORDON BERMANT, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN A BANKRUPTCY COURT: THE MEDIATION PROGRAM IN THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 46- 47 (1988) (discussing bankruptcy mediation, in a process
where only 5% of the cases typically result in a court decision).
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handpicked for one process or the other and are not true comparison
groups. 63 A few evaluations have attempted to control for selection bias by
using random assignment. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that outcomes
are related to program structure and design. 64
Despite these methodological issues, a number of studies suggest that
arbitration and litigation produce comparable macrojustice outcomes. For
example, a study of court-annexed non-binding arbitration found no
difference in mean outcome when comparing arbitrated and litigated cases.
65
Moreover, an evaluation of mandatory arbitration in Colorado compared win
rates in arbitration and litigation and found win rates to be similar.66 Other
studies have compared mediated or conventional settlement to litigation.
Using random assignment, a study comparing mediated settlement to
conventional settlement found that case outcomes were indistinguishable, but
that both case types differed from cases that went to trial: the proportion of
plaintiffs who received money for mediated settlement was eighty-eight
percent, while fifty-three percent of those who went to trial received
money. 67 The study also found that mediated and negotiated settlements
averaged $37,673 and $34,364, respectively, while trial awards averaged
$58,451.68 However, a different study of settled and arbitrated cases in
Hawaii found comparable outcomes. 69 One commentator notes that "a null
finding reassures" critics because "[h]ad systematic changes been discovered,
it would be necessary to address fundamental policy questions-and the
pursuit of simple efficiencies through court-annexed arbitration would likely
be discontinued, probably permanently."70
63 STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 49, at 16.
64 Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 911; Wissler, supra note 58, at 81.
65 E.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
FIRST YEAR 85 (1981).
66 Lloyd Burton et al., Mandatory Arbitration in Colorado: An Initial Look at a
PrivatizedADR Program, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 183, 189 (1991).
67 Stevens H. Clarke & Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship of Private
Settling: Court Ordered Civil Case Mediation, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 311,321 (1997).
68 Id.
69 John Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, Pushing the Limits on Court-Annexed
Arbitration: The Hawaii Experience, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 133, 144 (1991).
70 Keith 0. Boyum, Afterword: Does Court-Annexed Arbitration "Work"?, 14 JUST.
SYs. J. 244,245 (1991).
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IV. DISPUTE PROCESSING: COMPARING ADR AND LITIGATION
Courts experiment with ADR programs as a means of improving dispute
processing; a typical precipitating development is an overloaded docket.71
Professor Lande observes that the "precipitous decline in the number and rate
of trials" coincides with a "major increase in the number of pending cases." 72
Recent literature conceives dispute processing in a systemic perspective;
dispute systems are the "composition, arrangement, and structure of dispute
resolution processes in organizations," 73 and dispute system design is the
conscious, purposeful, and deliberate effort to identify and improve the way
an organization manages conflict by decisively and strategically arranging its
dispute resolution processes. 74 The dispute system designs currently used in
the federal courts vary widely.75 Some use a variety of voluntary ADR
71 Art Thompson, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Litigation in
Kansas, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 352-353 (2003). But see James R. Holbrook,
The Effects ofAlternative Dispute Resolution on Access to Justice in Utah, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 1017, 1019 (2006) (reporting that Utah had experienced few of the pressures that
normally prompt courts to use ADR, but nevertheless adopted ADR to provide less
expensive, faster, and better solutions than traditional court trials). More generally, courts
considered ADR "on the belief that it offered promise for earlier, less costly, and more
satisfactory disposition for many civil cases." Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court Is in
Session: What Judges Say About Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 377, 430 (2007) (reporting results of an extensive empirical study of judges'
views of mediation in the courts in Minnesota).
72 Lande, supra note 55, at 219.
73 Lisa B. Bingham & Tina Nabatchi, Dispute System Design in Organizations, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 105, 106 (William J. Pammer, Jr. & Jerri
Killian eds., 2003).
74 See generally CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT,
DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND
HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR
MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR
MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003); WILLIAM L. URY ET AL.,
GET ING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT
(1988). For streaming video of recent debates on the emerging field, see Dispute System
Design Symposium 2008, held by the Harvard Negotiation Law Review (Mar. 7, 2008),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2009); The Second Generation
of Dispute System Design: Reoccurring Problems and Potential Solutions, held by the
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (Jan. 24, 2008),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/jdr/symposiumi/2008/schedule.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
75 See generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STENSTRA, ADR AND
SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS (1996). For a review of empirical research on court-connected ADR structured
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interventions, mandatory ADR interventions, or a combination of both,
including non-binding arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation.76
Others use a dispute system design that combines interventions or offers
choices, as in the multi-door courthouse. 77 Apart from the valiant work of the
Federal Judicial Center78 and the nonprofit Resolution Systems Institute,79
there have been few systematic efforts to compare the efficacy of these
widely varying dispute system designs, although differences in design as to,
for example, the timing of an intervention, are often cited to explain different
results in evaluations of court-annexed ADR.80
One measure of an ADR program's effect on court efficiency is the trial
rate (the rate at which cases proceed from complaint to a full adjudicatory
trial before a judge or a jury). Using a random assignment design to compare
a treatment group of cases to a control group, Eaglin found that a pre-
argument conference program in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
increased the number of cases that are settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
dismissed for lack of prosecution.81 Moreover, it resulted in cases
terminating at an earlier stage in the appellate process. McEwen and Maiman
found that parties in small claims cases that went to mediation were twice as
likely to comply with their settlement as parties to an adjudicated case.82
Thus, the case was less likely to require further judicial intervention. They
reason that the voluntary consent characteristic of mediation is the central
factor responsible for the higher compliance rates.83 Others have argued that
around the elements of dispute system design and organized by the nature of the court as
small claims, general civil, and appellate, see Wissler, supra note 58.
7 6 E.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 2-3 (1996); see generally
Resolution System Institute's Court ADR Resource Center, http://courtadr.org (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009).
77 See, Frank E. A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 3 (2000).
78 For a number of downloadable publications evaluating ADR programs in a
variety of federal courts, see the Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009).
79 For a downloadable summary of seventy evaluations of court-connected
mediation programs with attention to the design features of each program and a
searchable database, see SHACK, supra note 61.
80 Wissler, supra note 58, at 68.
81 JAMES B. EAGLIN, FED. JUD. CTR., THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN
THE SixTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 41 (1990) available at
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/lntemet/mediation/eaglinevaluation ptl .htm.
82 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An
Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237,261 (1981).
83 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 11, 40-45 (1984).
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mandatory mediation rules can be valuable to encourage parties to use the
process.84 A number of studies have found that voluntary and mandatory
ADR programs are about equally effective at settling cases. 85
Closely related to trial rates is time to disposition. In general, time to
disposition is measured in terms of a case's life on the court's docket (the
elapsed time from filing a complaint to closing a case due to settlement).
Researchers have used a variety of methods to measure whether ADR saves
disposition time as compared to litigation, including surveys, archival data
sources, and random assignment experiments. For example, using survey
research methods, the Federal Judicial Center found that attorneys believed
that court-annexed arbitration saved them billable time and reduced costs,
and that their clients spent less time on the case as a result of the arbitration
process.86 There were similar findings in an attorney survey that was part of
an evaluation of North Carolina court-ordered arbitration.87 The Federal
Judicial Center found that almost half of surveyed lawyers in one district and
more than half in another felt ADR reduced disposition time of their cases.
The majority of surveyed attorneys in three districts believed that ADR
decreased the cost of the cases.88 Similarly, a study of counsel in civil cases
in Ontario, Canada found that attorneys reported lower fees in mediated
cases.8 9 Recently, counsel in California civil trial courts reported cost savings
if a case settled in mediation. 90
Researchers also use archival data sources to examine how long cases
remain on the court's docket with and without ADR. For example,
84 Sander, supra note 77, at 6-8.
85 See, e.g., Steven B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants'Perspectives on the
Differences Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 249,254 (1990); Craig
A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual
Processes and Outcomes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION 66 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989); Jessica Pearson &
Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade of Research, in
MEDIATION RESEARCH: TE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD PARTY
INTERVENTION 18 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989).
86 BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, FED. JUD. CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN
DISTRICT COURTS 85-89 (1990).
87 Stevens H. Clarke et al., Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Case
Outcomes and Litigant Satisfaction, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 154, 160 (1991).
88 STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 50, at 9.
89 JULIE MACFARLANE, COURT-BASED MEDIATION OF CIvIL CASES: AN EVALUATION
OF THE ONTARIO COURT (GENERAL DIVISION) ADR CENTRE (1995).
90 HEATHER ANDERSON & RON Pi, EVALUATION OF THE EARLY MEDIATION PILOT
PROGRAMS 65-66 (2004), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/
empprept.pdf.
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researchers found that arbitrated cases had shorter disposition times than
litigated cases. 91 Similarly, Hanson and Keilitz found that arbitrated cases
had shorter disposition times than cases litigated before the arbitration
program was implemented, without slowing the disposition of cases left for
litigation.92 Researchers studying ADR programs in Maine courts compared
time to disposition and settlement by examining case records before and after
the ADR program; 93 they found support for the general proposition that
earlier in the life of the case is better.94 So too, researchers studying an
arbitration program in civil trial courts in Arizona found that the earlier in the
life of the case a county tended to assign a case to arbitration, the shorter the
mean disposition time.95
The most comprehensive evaluation of court-annexed programs to date is
popularly known as the Rand Report. 96 That study found no significant
decrease in time to disposition in six court programs using mediation or early
neutral evaluation. In one district, ADR increased time to disposition, but this
was apparently a function of selection bias, in that judges encouraged the
most intractable cases to use mediation and thus delayed trial. Similarly, the
study found no significant evidence of cost savings. Likewise, Meierhoefer
found no overall evidence that court-annexed arbitration reduced time to
disposition in a random assignment design. 97
Other scholars, using a random assignment design to evaluate court-
ordered arbitration in North Carolina, found that various programs reduced
91 E.g., ME1ERHOEFER, supra 86, at 95 (citing Eastern Pennsylvania results using a
before and after design reported in E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial
Center rev. ed. 1983)).
92 Roger A. Hanson & Susan Keilitz, Arbitration and Case Processing Time:
Lessons from Fulton County, 14 JUST. SYs. J. 203 (1991).
93 Howard H. Dana, Jr., Court-Connected Alternative Dispute Resolution in Maine,
57 ME. L. REV. 349,375 (2005).
94 Id. at 390-91 (2005) (reporting on a study of the courts comparing data from
2000, 2002, and 2003). A study of 1995-1997 Maine pilot program also found support
for an earlier intervention. Id. at 372 n. 149. Similarly, Schmitz argues that earlier in the
life of the case is better. Suzanne J. Schmitz, A Critique of Illinois Circuit Rules
Concerning Court-Ordered Mediation, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 783, 792 (2005).
95 Roselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Court-Connected Arbitration in the Superior
Court of Arizona: A Study of Its Performance and Proposed Rule Changes, 2007 J. DISP.
RESOL. 65, 79-80 (2007).
96 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 76.
97 MEIERHOEFER, supra note 86.
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disposition time by 10o--45%.98 Another group of researchers also used a
random assignment design in the evaluation of the Western District of
Missouri's Federal District Court Early Assessment Program.99 Early
assessment is a form of early neutral evaluation in which a third party
examines the merits of the case and gives an opinion on its strengths and
weaknesses to the disputants. The evaluation examined the program over a
period of four and one-half years, using random assignment including over
three-thousand cases assigned to one of three treatments: mandatory,
voluntary, or no assessment. In mandatory assessment, the parties received a
neutral evaluation of the merits of their case whether they asked for one or
not.100 In voluntary assessment, the parties could request the evaluation. 10 1 In
the no assessment condition, there was no neutral evaluation of the strengths
or weaknesses of the case before trial. 10 2 They found that mandatory
assessment cases terminated significantly earlier than both the voluntary
assessment and no assessment groups, 10 3 The researchers attributed the result
in part to the timing of the assessment, in that a notice of session date was
sent to the mandatory assessment cases when they were ready, while an
invitation to participate was sent to the voluntary cases, creating a lag time
during which the court and parties scheduled the session. 10 4 Maine courts
also used random assignment to assess impact on disposition time; while
cases opting into ADR voluntarily had the shortest mean disposition time,
cases randomly assigned to ADR also terminated more quickly. 105
There has been some debate in the literature about the impact of delay
reduction programs in the courts. Some contend that the delay reduction
programs will have only transitory effects because they will be offset by an
increase in demand for litigation. 10 6 However, recent studies reveal that the
length of time a case spends on the court's docket is partly a function of the
timing of the ADR intervention. 107 Spurr found that early intervention by a
98 Clarke & Gordon, supra note 67; STEVENS H. CLARKE ET AL., INST. OF GOV'T,
COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS
(1989); Clarke et al., supra note 87.
99 STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 49.
100 Id. at 226-231.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 247-248.
104 Id. at 250.
105 Dana, Jr., supra note 93, at 368 (examining 1988-90 pilot in superior court).
106 For a discussion, see Stephen J. Spurr, The Duration of Litigation, 19 LAW &
POL'Y 285 (1997).
107 Id.
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judge imposing a time schedule created a deadline effect and resulted in
earlier settlement. 10 8 In comparison, where mandatory arbitration is
scheduled relatively late in the life of a case, it will tend to lengthen the time
cases spend on the court's docket. 109 This is because litigants delay their own
bilateral settlement discussions and instead wait for the ADR intervention.1 10
Lawyers delay settlement negotiations until the eve of--or after-arbitration.
For example, researchers have found no decrease in time to disposition for
court-ordered arbitration, but found a decrease when the parties voluntarily
elected arbitration." '1 However, researchers could draw no conclusions about
cost savings because it was difficult to distinguish cases that would have
settled without ADR. 112
Studies of mediation in small claims court generally find no shortening
of time to disposition because the dispute system design generally provides
for mediation to occur on the day of trial."13 The timing of the ADR
intervention is important. There is a debate as to whether it should occur
before or after completion of discovery. 114 One study of general civil
108 Id.
109 Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of Court Arbitration: A
Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 229 (1991); ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET
AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE
ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988).
110 Some have recommended mandatory mediation programs specifically to create a
deadline effect to trigger settlements. See, e.g., Christopher Fugarino, Mandating
Mediation for Cases Before the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Can Improve
the Efficiency of the Court and the Experience of the Parties, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 384
(2006/2007).
111 HENSLER, ET AL., supra note 65, at 80.
112 Id. at 81.
113 Wissler, supra note 58.
114 McAdoo, supra note 71, at 420 (reporting results of an empirical study of
mediation in Minnesota courts). Professor McAdoo reports:
If mediation only replaces bilateral attorney negotiations on the courthouse
steps, or even the judicial settlement conference, the potential for significant cost
savings to parties seems to be limited. Earlier research suggested that most
mediation occurred after almost all discovery on a case is completed. In the survey,
the judges were asked two questions about mediation practice vis-A-vis discovery
practice: (1) At what point does the mediation process usually occur; and (2) When
do judges think mediation should occur in a case?
A majority of the judges (57%) believe that mediation occurs after all or almost
all discovery is completed. Only 43% of the judges, however, think that mediation
should occur at this late point. Instead they think mediation should occur "after
limited targeted discovery."
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mediation in Ohio found that earlier mediation referral was associated with
earlier termination of the case.115
V. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Although some research on ADR has explored the intersection between
administrative agencies and the courts, especially in regard to agency
discretion to use ADR or pursue litigation and the impacts of those specific
cases in terms of macrojustice, many questions remain unanswered. 1 6 How
does the federal government use ADR in legal actions and for what kinds of
cases? How do ADR cases compare to litigated cases in terms of
macrojustice issues? Are there substantive differences in the disposition
outcomes of ADR and litigation cases? Are there differences in trial rates and
disposition times between ADR and litigation cases? If ADR is used, does
the timing of the intervention affect disposition time?
This study is a first step toward answering these questions. It is the first
comprehensive evaluation of ADR use at the Department of Justice (DOJ). It
examines litigation and ADR in civil cases handled by Assistant U. S.
Attorneys (AUSAs) across the United States. These cases generally originate
in other federal agencies and are transferred to DOJ for action in various
district courts across the country. 117 The cases are handled by AUSAs and
their assistants, who largely comprise the judicial face of the federal
government. These AUSAs do not control the initiation of most lawsuits, but
rather make strategic choices about managing the caseloads assigned to them,
including whether to use ADR. The cases allow for an examination of how
DOJ (and by proxy the federal government) is using ADR in civil matters
and for what kinds of cases.
VI. THE DATA
DOJ regularly collects information about its cases in various
computerized data tracking systems. This data is generally used for internal
purposes; however, officials from the DOJ Office of Dispute Resolution
provided three datasets for this study. The first dataset contained general
information about all civil cases handled by AUSAs across the country from
1995 to 1998. The second dataset contained data from evaluation forms
Id. (citations omitted).
115 Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What
We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 641 (2002).
116 See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 13; Wissler, supra note 58.
117 28 U.S.C. § 515 (2008).
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completed by AUSAs in cases where they used ADR. The third dataset came
from the Financial Management Information System and contained
information about funding for ADR neutrals. The information in all datasets
was organized by case name, case number, and filing date. Using these
variables, our researchers consolidated the three datasets into a single,
comprehensive database. The database was cleaned to facilitate statistical
analyses. Duplicate entries were removed and several variables were recoded
to facilitate meaningful analysis.
For example, the original dataset contained thirty-one specific causes of
action, which were consolidated into six general causes of action
(Employment Discrimination, Civil Rights, Fraud, Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA), l i 8 Medical Recovery, and Bivens 11 9) for the purpose of data
analysis. The substantive legal areas, the original causes of action, and the
consolidated causes of action are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Substantive Legal Areas and Causes of Action
Substantive Original Causes of Action Consolidated
Legal Area Cause of Action
(COFAGRP)
Employment • Includes discrimination complaints Employment
Discrimination based on Age, the Equal Pay Act, DiscriminationHandicap, and Title VII
* Access to Clinic Entrances
" Americans with Disabilities Act
" Employment Discrimination
(affirmative)
Civil Rights * Fair Credit Civil Rights
" Rights of Institutionalized Persons
" Fair Housing
" School Desegregation
" Voting Rights
118 For a discussion of administrative dispute resolution of these claims, see Jeffrey
Axelrad, Federal Tort Claims Act Administrative Claims: Better Than Third-Party ADR
for Resolving Federal Tort Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1331 (2000).
119 Bivens cases are suits brought against unknown federal agents alleging
wrongdoing. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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" Anti-Kickback
" Government Commercial Programs
" Education
" Environmental
" False Claims
" Health Care Fraud (other than
Fraud Medicare-Medicaid) Fraud
o Medicaid (may also include
Medicare)
" Medicare Only
" Procurement Fraud
" Qui Tam Suits (Suits brought under
the False Claims Act by private
citizens)
" Air Crash
* Asbestos
" Conversion of Property
" Drivers, Motor Vehicle Accidents
" Medical Malpractice
" Property Damage FTCA
" Personal Injury
Torts o Wrongful Death
" Other Non-Government Individuals
(e.g., witnesses and jurors) Sued in
Their Individual Capacity---------------------------------------
" Medical Care Recovery Act Medical
" Medicare Recovery
o Government Agents Sued in Their Bivens
Individual Capacity, e.g., Bivens
The variable "U.S. Role" refers to the role of the Assistant U.S. Attorney
(AUSA), representing the United States government, in the case. The original
database contained fourteen specific classifications for U.S. Role.
Researchers consolidated and recoded this variable into three categories:
Defendant, Plaintiff, and Other. This consolidation for the variable U.S. Role
is shown in Table 2.
246
[Vol. 24:2 2009]
COMPARING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AND ADR OUTCOMES
Table 2: Consolidation of Classifications for U.S. Role
Original U.S. Role Consolidated U.S. Role
* Defendant Defendant
" Plaintiff Plaintiff
* Amicus
* Appeal Filed Against
* U.S. Has Filed the Appeal
* Creditor
* Counsel Cost Plus Contractor
* Counsel for Government Employee Other
* Third Party Defendant
* Counsel for Native American
* Third Party Plaintiff
* Other
* Intervenor
* Counsel for Veteran
The variable "Court" refers to the type of court in which the case was
docketed. The original database contained seven specific classifications for
Court. Researchers recoded the variable to create only three possibilities:
District Court, State Court, and Other. The consolidation for this variable is
shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Consolidation of Classifications for Court
Original Court Consolidated Court
* District Court District Court
" State Court State Court
" Bankruptcy Court
" U.S. Claims Court
" District Court (Miscellaneous) Other
* Magistrate Court (Miscellaneous)
" Tribal Court
"Disposition" refers to the final disposition of the case. The Disposition
variable originally contained fifty-eight specific classifications. Researchers
recoded this variable to create six possible case dispositions: Dismissed,
Judgment, Settlement, Closed, Other, and Unknown. The consolidation for
the disposition variable is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: Consolidation of Classifications for Disposition
[Vol. 24:2 2009]
Original Disposition
Dismissed
Dismissed on Courts on Motion
Declination
Discharged
Death or Incompetency
Dismissed without Prejudice
Dismissed by Stipulation
Dismissed on Other Party's Motion
Dismissed on U.S. Motion
Declined-Department Policy
Declined-Lacks Legislative Merit
Consolidated
Disposition
Dismissed
" Judgment for Opposing Party-Default Judgment
" Judgment for U.S.-Jury Trial
* Judgment/Order (other) for Opposing Party
" Judgment for Opposing Party-Court Trial Jdgment
" Judgment/Order (other) for U.S.
" Default Judgment for U.S.
" Judgment for U.S.-Court Trial
* Judgment for Opposing Party-Jury Trial
* Administrative Settlement
* Consent Judgment for Opposing Party
* Consent Order
" Judgment for U.S.-Consent Judgment
" Settlement: Non-Monetary Settlement
" Settlement: Monetary Recovery by Opposing Party
" Settlement: Monetary Recovery by U.S.
" ADR Settlement-Monetary Recovery by Opposing
Party
o ADR Settlement-Monetary Recovery by U.S.
" Closed-No Distributable Assets
* Closed-Possession of Property by Government Closed
" Closed-Property Released to Owner
o Closed without Action I
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* Amended Judgment
* Bankruptcy Plan Confirmed
" Proof of Claim Filed (no further action)
" Bankruptcy Decision Unfavorable to U.S.
" Compliance
* Consolidated by Court
* Denied
* Disclaimer of Interest
" Decision (other than Dismissal/Judgment) by Court Other
" Favorable to U.S.
" Granted
" Just Compensation and Distribution Determined
" New Filing
" Opened in Error/Office Error
* Realization of All Available Assets
" Returned to Agency Transfer from District (Rule
20, 21)
* Cases without Recorded Disposition nknown
* Cases with Unidentifiable Disposition Code U
After this cleaning process, the database contained a total of 15,288
cases, with case-specific measures of time, disposition, and case
demography, in addition to other quantitative and qualitative measures. Of
the 15,288 cases, 14,777 (96.7%) went through traditional litigation
processes, while 511 (3.3%) received an ADR intervention. It is important to
note that this large sample of cases reflects a broad cross section of courts
and ADR programs. The cases reflect the individual discretion of judges to
refer a matter to ADR as part of case management.' 20 The cases provide us
with a window into early ADR experience by the federal government in
litigation nationwide.
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Three sets of statistical analyses were performed on the dataset to answer
the research questions. The first analysis examines some of the basic
120 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REv. 1961 (2007) (examining the role of the judge as a strategic player in
efforts to settle the individual litigated case); Schmitz, supra note 94, at 789-92
(describing broad court discretion to order mediation and wide variation in the nature of
the cases and timing of intervention).
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characteristics of ADR and litigation cases. The second analysis focuses on
issues of macrojustice. The final analysis focuses only on ADR cases and
examines the timing of the ADR intervention in relation to disposition time.
The results and discussion for each analysis are below.
A. Characteristics of ADR and Litigation Cases
The first analysis provides descriptive statistics of ADR and litigation
cases regarding the causes of action and the role of the U.S. government in
the cases. These variables provide a simple picture of how DOJ uses ADR in
legal actions and for what types of cases. The analysis also includes a brief
discussion about the costs and benefits of using ADR as perceived by
AUSAs.
1. Cause ofAction
Table 5 displays the number and percentage of cases involving ADR as
compared to traditional litigation, broken down for each cause of action. The
table shows that ADR is used in disproportionate frequency for Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) and Employment Discrimination cases. While FTCA
cases only comprise 39% (n = 5937) of the total cases and 38% (n = 5600) of
the litigation cases, they comprise 66% (n = 337) of the ADR cases.
Likewise, Employment Discrimination cases comprise 22% of both the total
cases (n = 3410) and the litigation cases (n = 3259), as compared to 30% (n =
151) of the ADR cases. Together, these two causes of action account for 96%
(n = 488) of the cases where ADR was used. In contrast, they constitute only
60% (n = 8859) of the cases where traditional litigation was used. There was
negligible use of ADR in the other four cause of action categories. ADR was
used in only 2% of Civil Rights cases, and in 1% of Fraud, Bivens, and
Medical Recovery cases. In contrast, these four causes of action comprise
40% of all traditional litigation cases.
These differences may be explained by institutional theory. The
application of ADR to tort and employment discrimination cases has a long
and well-established history in government and in the private sector,
especially as compared to other types of cases. Therefore, the use of ADR for
these cases has been largely institutionalized in government and holds
legitimacy as a practice that can serve a variety of governmental interests. 12 1
121 Tina Nabatchi, The Institutionalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
Federal Government, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 646 (2007).
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Table 5: Total Number of Litigation and
Action
Cause of Action
FTCA
Employment
discrimination
Civil rights
Fraud
Bivens
Medical recovery
Total
Litigation
5600
(38%)
3259
(22%)
635
(4%)
1314
(9%)
2373
(16%)
1595
(11%)
14777
(100%)
ADR Cases for Each Cause of
ADR
337
(66%)
151
(30%)
10
(2%)
5
(1%)
5
(1%)
3
(>1%)
511
(100%)
Total
5937
(39%)
3410
(22%)
645
(4%)
1319
(9%)
2378
(16%)
1599
(10%)
15288
(100%)
2. U. S. Role
Table 6 shows that ADR was used disproportionately often when the
government was a defendant in a lawsuit. The government was a defendant
in 96% (n = 488) of the cases where ADR was used, but only in 78% (n =
11918) of the cases where traditional litigation was used. This difference
may stem from the fact that when the government is a plaintiff, it may be
more likely to pursue cases that may set legal precedent. When the
government is bringing an enforcement action, for example, it may desire a
court to rule on the case so that this decision can be used to assist the
prosecution of future lawsuits. In such cases, the application of ADR may not
be appropriate, because ADR does not result in a court precedent.
Table 6: U.S. Role in Litigation and ADR Cases
U. S. Role Litigation Cases ADR Cases
Defendant 11918 (78%) 488 (96%)
Plaintiff 1644(11%) 12(2%)
Other 1726 (11%) 11(2%)
Total 15288 (100%) 511 (100%)
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3. Costs and Benefits of ADR
Researchers also examined the AUSA evaluation form dataset to
qualitatively compare ADR and litigation cases. 122 Many AUSAs believed
that, as compared to litigation, ADR saved both time and money. AUSAs
subjectively estimated that on average, they spent about twelve hours
preparing for ADR and about seven hours in the ADR session itself. In total,
they estimated that ADR saved eighty-eight hours of staff time and six
months of litigation time (meaning the case resolved six months earlier than
it would have without ADR). 123 AUSAs also suggested that ADR saved
money. On average, they spent $869 in fees for the ADR neutral and
estimated ADR resulted in a savings of $10,735 in litigation expenses.124
Table 7 summarizes these figures.
Table 7: The Perceived Costs and Benefits of Using ADR
Costs of ADR
Average fee paid to the mediator $869
Average time spent in preparation 12 hours
Average time spent in mediation 7 hours
Estimated Benefits from ADR
Average litigation costs saved $10,735
Average staff time saved 88 hours
Average litigation time saved 6 months
122 These evaluation forms were completed by AUSAs upon the termination of a
case in which they used ADR. This dataset consisted of 828 forms completed between
1994 and 2000.
123 "Staff time" was defined as, "[t]he number of hours you and others (including
paralegals) would have spent on this case if ADR had not been used." It only captures
time saved by the lawyers and their offices, and it does not include time that was saved
by the client agency. "Litigation time" was defined as, "[t]he number of months it would
have taken to achieve final resolution of the case if ADR had not been used."
124 "Litigation expenses" were defined as, "[t]he amount of money you would have
spent on transcripts, witness fees, A.L.S. [Automated Litigation Support], travel, etc. to
prepare and litigate this case if ADR had not been used." These estimates do not include
savings of attorney fees.
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B. Macrojustice in ADR and Litigation
It is now appropriate to turn to a larger examination of macrojustice
issues in ADR and litigation. Macrojustice involves issues about the fairness
of dispute resolution processes and, specifically, about whether a particular
dispute resolution process favors one side or the other. Issues of macrojustice
take on heightened importance when the federal government is a litigant. If
the government received better results in ADR than in traditional litigation,
private parties would be reluctant to use ADR with the government because
they would fare better in court. Conversely, if the government did worse in
ADR than in litigation, government counsel would choose not to participate
in the process. This study focuses on macrojustice issues involving case
disposition, settlement rates, and monetary relief.
1. Case Disposition and Settlement Rates
Table 8 presents information on the disposition of cases. Cases in which
ADR was used settled almost two-thirds of the time (65%, n = 333), while
cases that did not use ADR settled less than one-third of the time (29%, n =
4259). Roughly half of this difference is accounted for by the fact that ADR
cases were dismissed by the court less frequently (19%, n = 95) than
traditional litigation cases (34%, n = 4968). Nonetheless, this difference
suggests that ADR may be a more effective vehicle for obtaining a settlement
than traditional litigation
Table 8: Disposition of Cases
Disposition Litigation Cases ADR Cases Total
Dismissed 4968 (34%) 95 (19%) 5063 (33%)
Settlement 4259 (29%) 333 (65%) 4592 (30%)
Judgment 1330 (9%) 38 (7%) 1368 (9%)
Closed 357 (2%) 1 (.2%) 358 (2%)
Other 1283 (9%) 14 (3%) 1297 (8%)
Unknown 2580 (17%) 30 (6%) 2610 (17%)
Total 14777 (100%) 511 (100%) 15288 (100%)
Researchers examined the dispositions of ADR cases more closely by
comparing voluntary ADR cases (47.5%, n = 285) to those that were court-
ordered (52.5%, n = 315) (see Table 9). While 60% (n = 362) of all these
ADR cases reached settlement, more voluntary ADR cases (71%, n = 203)
settled than did court-ordered cases (50%, n = 159)-a statistically
significant difference (p < .001). This difference may stem from the fact that
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when attorneys voluntarily choose ADR for a specific case, they believe the
process may be of value given the facts and circumstances of that case. In
contrast, mandatory court programs often require that attorneys use ADR
even when they believe it would be fruitless in a particular case. This finding
has important implications for program designers, as it indicates that
mandatory ADR programs may have lower overall effectiveness in settling
cases in certain circumstances.
Table 9: Disposition of ADR Cases
Type of Case Settled Other Disposition Total
Court-ordered ADR 159 (50%) 156 (50%) 315 (52.5%)
Voluntary ADR 203 (71%) 82 (29%) 285 (47.5%)
Total 362 (60%) 238 (40%) 600 (100%)
Researchers also found an interesting difference between the settlement
rates of the two largest categories of cases. While 60% (n = 76) of
employment discrimination cases settled, 73% (n = 248) of torts cases settled
(see Table 10), a statistically significant difference (p < .001). This difference
may be due in part to the fact that by the time a case gets to DOJ, it has often
been pending for a year or more at the agency level. Employment
discrimination cases regularly involve parties who are still involved in long-
term relationships with one another (sometimes still working at the same
office). During the time that the case is pending, it is possible continued
friction might cause the relationship to further deteriorate, making settlement
less likely. Moreover, by 1995, all federal agencies had implemented dispute
resolution in employment discrimination cases, which might have
contributed to early settlement at the agency level. In contrast, parties in tort
disputes often have little contact with one another, other than in the litigation
context; thus, there may be less opportunity for their relationships (which are
likely temporary in any case) to erode. If so, this would suggest it is
important to resolve employment discrimination cases early-before the
parties become so at loggerheads with one another that the case becomes
much harder to settle.
254
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Table 10: Dispositions of Employment Discrimination and Tort ADR
Cases
Employment Torts TotalDisposition Discrimination
Settled 76 (60%) 248 (73%) 324 (69%)
Other disposition 51(40%) 92 (27%) 143 (31%)
Total 127 340 467
2. Monetary Relief
Macrojustice debates about ADR and litigation have addressed issues of
both monetary relief requested and monetary relief granted. Some have
speculated that plaintiffs may do better in ADR than in litigation because
plaintiffs who settle a case sidestep the possibility of having a judge dismiss
the lawsuit entirely (dismissal occurs in a significant number of litigated
cases). 125 On the other hand, some believe that plaintiffs may do worse in
ADR than in litigation because they may settle for less than their case is
worth out of fear that they will recover nothing if a jury finds in favor of the
defendant. 126 Thus, determining whether there are differences between ADR
and litigation cases in the amount of relief granted is an important
macrojustice issue, especially when viewed from a public policy perspective.
To examine these issues, we compared ADR and litigation cases with
respect to monetary relief requested by parties and monetary relief granted by
the decisionmaker. Specifically, we used matched pair samples to compare
the monetary outcomes of ADR and litigation cases, while controlling for
other variables.' 27
The first matched pair sample examines differences between ADR and
litigation cases with respect to the amount of relief requested, while
controlling for cause of action, the role of the U.S., the type of court in which
the case was docketed, the amount of relief granted (using the absolute value
of the difference), and other variables when necessary to identify a single
125 Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 105, 112-113 (2003) (reporting that some 60% of cases in federal court are resolved
through summary judgment).
126 See generally, Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2001) (arguing for a cooling off period to correct for undue mediator
pressure to settle).
127 While the limitations and potential biases inherent to the matched-pair
comparison used for this analysis are well-understood by the authors, the nature of the
data unfortunately precluded more sophisticated methods of analysis.
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match. This sample contains 277 ADR and litigation cases. The mean
amount of relief requested in ADR cases ($3,203,882.37) is lower than the
mean amount of relief requested in litigation cases ($5,144,618.16), but this
difference is not statistically significant (p<.6017).
The second matched pair sample examines differences between ADR
and litigation cases with respect to the amount of relief granted. This sample
was constructed in the same manner as the first sample, except that "relief
granted" was replaced with "relief requested." The second sample contains
272 ADR and litigation cases. Corresponding with the results for relief
requested, the mean amount of relief granted in litigation cases ($228,140.18)
is greater than the mean amount of relief granted in ADR cases
($190,621.52). As with relief requested, this difference is not statistically
significant (p<.5526). Researchers also examined employment discrimination
and FTCA cases separately, and found that there are no statistically
significant differences in the amount of relief granted between these types of
ADR and litigation cases (p<. 1136).
These findings address the concern that an ADR process might change
the outcomes that would otherwise result from litigation. The analyses show
that, in general, parties in ADR and litigation cases request and are granted
about the same amount of relief. The results provide evidence that ADR did
not have the macrojustice effect of altering traditional legal remedies in these
cases.
C. Dispute Processing: Timing of the ADR Intervention and Time to
Disposition
For the final analysis, we were interested in examining the relationship
between the timing of the ADR intervention and final disposition. More
specifically, we wanted to determine whether the time at which ADR was
introduced in a case had an impact on the time it took the case to reach final
disposition. Experienced trial lawyers say that there are four classic points of
settlement in the life of a case: (1) immediately before the complaint is filed;
(2) immediately after the complaint is filed; (3) upon completion of
discovery; and (4) on the eve of trial. 128 Researchers have found that there is
a "deadline effect" associated with certain events in the life of a case, such as
the scheduling of a settlement conference. 12 9 It stands to reason then, that the
earlier one uses ADR, the earlier a case may settle.
128 Personal conversation with Robert Cathcart, former chair of the Litigation
Department of Shipman and Goodwin, Hartford, Connecticut.
129 Spurr, supra note 106, at 305.
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To conduct the analysis, we examined ADR cases for three elements: (1)
when an ADR intervention was introduced; (2) the average time from the
introduction of ADR to the final disposition; and (3) the average time from
filing of the case to final disposition. The results, displayed in Table 11 and
in Figure 1, clearly show that when ADR is introduced early in the life of the
case, it takes the case less time to reach final disposition. For example,
among cases in which ADR was introduced within ninety days of filing, it
took, on average, only ninety-two days from the ADR intervention to reach
final disposition, and a total of 150 days from filing to final disposition. The
average time from filing to final disposition increases steadily when ADR is
introduced to cases later in their life. In addition, the time from the ADR
intervention to final disposition also generally increases as ADR is
introduced to a case later in its life. For example, when ADR was introduced
within 91-180 days of filing, it took, on average, 190 days from the ADR
intervention to reach final disposition, and 339 days from filing to reach final
disposition. Together, these results suggest that as the time from case filing
to the introduction of the ADR intervention increases, so does the average
amount of time it takes a case to reach final disposition increase.
Table 11: Time from Filing to ADR Intervention
Average Time from ADR Average Time from
to Final Disposition Filing to Disposition
0-90 days 92 150
91-180 days 190 339
181-270 days 121 348
271-360 days 146 457
361-450 days 101 502
451-540 days 157 659
541-630 days 126 701
631+ days 154 879
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Figure 1: Relationship between Time of ADR Intervention and Final
Disposition
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VIR. CONCLUSION
The findmigs reported here provide a more complete picture of ADR use
in the Department of Justice (and by proxy the federal government). These
findings show the overall impact without controlling for the individual
dispute system design choices of various districts. ADR was used most
frequently (in 96% of cases) when the U.S. government was a defendant. In
addition, FTCA and employment discrimination cases together represent a
disproportionate amount (96%) of the ADR cases. AUSAs reported
subjective estimates of both time and money saved in ADR cases compared
to litigation cases. Further analyses support the perceptions of AUSAs and
suggest that ADR can be an efficient and effective procedural solution to the
problems of time and cost in the justice system.
The analysis shows that 65% of cases settled when ADR was used, but
only 29% of cases settled when it was not. This difference provides some
support for claims that ADR is a better process than litigation for producing
settlements among disputing parties. In addition, significantly more cases
settled when ADR was voluntary than when it was mandatory (71% vs.
50%). This suggests an opt-out program may function more effectively than
[Vol. 24:2 2009]
COMPARING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AND ADR OUTCOMES
a mandate. Tort cases were significantly more likely to settle than
employment discrimination cases (73% vs. 60%), which suggests that federal
government ADR use may be somewhat more effective in some types of
cases than others, or, in the alternative, that federal agency in-house ADR
programs settled the less intractable cases before they got to litigation.
One major concern about ADR in the civil justice system is whether it
may produce outcomes that are substantively different from those produced
in litigation. In our large sample, analyses show that ADR cases do not
significantly differ from traditional litigation in terms of monetary outcomes.
The findings suggest that parties in ADR and litigation cases request, and are
granted, about the same amount of relief. They suggest that, at least in the
context of federal court-connected ADR in which a third party designed a
program for the disputants, there is no evidence of "second class justice;"
ADR did not have the macrojustice effect of undermining traditional legal
monetary remedies in those cases. 130
In terms of dispute processing efficiencies, the descriptive data show that
the earlier ADR is used in a case, the more quickly the case reaches
resolution. 131 This result replicates independent studies in a number of state
courts suggesting that, with an appropriate opt-out for good cause, early
referral to ADR may facilitate settlement.
Nevertheless, this dataset is limited. We have no data regarding case
complexity or the personal characteristics of the disputing parties. We cannot
control for the myriad variations in court ADR programs or the individual
variations in how judges exercised their discretion to refer cases, or not, to
ADR. We cannot control for the nature of the ADR intervention, although
the vast majority of cases used mediation. Overall, this study provides a
better picture of how ADR is used by the government in federal court cases
during the period of early institutionalization and precipitous decline in trials.
However, more work remains. Our data reflects a limited time period; it is
necessary to continue empirical assessment to compare these results with the
current pattern of outcomes in ADR and litigated cases.
As Professor Sternlight has observed, ADR is now a permanent feature
of our courts, and we need more research on how it functions and what
130 An open research question is whether adhesive systems designed by a single
disputant and imposed on the other-as in mandatory employment or consumer
arbitration-would produce similar macrojustice patterns.
131 A multivariate regression analysis found that the date of the ADR intervention
explained almost 60% of the variance in disposition time; however, the model was
underspecified due to the absence of so many explanatory and control variables from our
dataset, so we have omitted it here.
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disputants want.132 ADR has the potential to improve dispute processing
without sacrificing the quality of justice. Professor Lande has outlined a
research agenda that moves beyond whether mediation (and presumably
other forms of ADR) works or not, and instead, citing Professor McEwen,
argues that we should focus on how parties and their lawyers "work" ADR
systems.133 This requires collecting not only data about litigated cases, but
also about negotiation and settlement in the shadow of the civil justice
system. 134 Professor McAdoo observes that ADR programs should be held to
the standard of achieving substantive and procedural justice, which requires
systems to monitor and evaluate ADR programs; she argues we risk a breach
of the public trust otherwise. 135
Scholars have lamented the current state of our knowledge about how
ADR functions in the federal courts, and a significant aspect of the problem
is the wide variation in dispute system designs. 136 Our study did not control
132 Jean R. Stemlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289,290-91 (2003).
133 John Lande, Commentary, Focusing on Program Design Issues in Future
Research on Court-Connected Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 89 (2004). See also John
Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69 (2002).
134 Lande, supra note 55, at 234-35 (2006).
135 McAdoo, supra note 71, at 430; see also Donna Shestowski, Disputants'
Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care
and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 549 (2008) and Donna
Shestowsky, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures:An Ex Ante and
Ex Poste Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008).
136 Ward, supra note 29, at 86-87 (2007). Ward states that:
Research is increasing, but still is sparse, and empirical research done in a
particular jurisdiction may reflect only the operation of a fairly unique program
operating in a local legal culture at a particular point in time. Even if a study is well-
planned and reliable, the focus on particular programs and jurisdictions may make
extrapolation of results to other court programs problematic. Additionally,
inferences drawn from such research may or may not have wider application. This
difficulty may help explain the variation in results reported as well as the sharply
differing conclusions that different scholars draw from the available data.
One particular difficulty has been the continued dearth of solid information
about which ADR measures work and what side effects they produce. Controlled
experiments can provide the most reliable data about the impact of remedial
measures on quality and efficiency standards, but for various reasons are rarely
undertaken. Findings produced by the studies that are most frequently done-
surveys and analyses of statistical reports or other archival data - are of uncertain
validity because of the problem of screening out the impact of extraneous factors in
the absence of a rigorous control group. Legal scholars still hotly debate the
reliability and interpretation of results.
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for these. We need more and better research data to examine how design
variables affect disposition time, trial rates, and substantive outcomes.
The American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution has
proposed ten indicators for courts to collect so that the field can
systematically assess differences in the impact of ADR programs
nationally. 137 These include:
1. Was ADR used for this case? (yes/no)
2. What ADR process was used in this case? (Mediation, early neutral
assessment, non-binding arbitration, fact-finding, mini-trial, summary jury
trial, other)
3. Timing Information (the date the claim was docketed; the date of
referral to ADR; the date of first ADR session; the date of close of ADR
referral period; at what point in the docket duration did ADR occur (Before
suit, after filing suit, before discovery, just before trial); the final disposition
date of the case; the date of post-trial motions).
4. Whether the case settled because of ADR. If settled, whether the case
settled in full or settled in part.
5. What precipitated the use of ADR? (Court order sua sponte; party
consent to the process; party motion with one or more parties opposed and a
court order for ADR following; automatic referral per court rule due to kind
of case)
6. Was there a settlement without ADR? (yes/no) If so, how was the
case terminated-e.g., dispositive motion, settlement in ADR, settlement by
some other process, during or after trial, removal to another court, etc.
7. Case type (general civil, criminal, domestic, housing, traffic, small
claims)
8. The cost of the ADR process to the participants
9. Did the disputants use more than one form of ADR? If so, which?
10. Satisfaction data: How satisfied are the participants with the process,
the outcome, and the neutral?
In a perfect world, every court would collect this data. If we had it,
researchers could control more systematically for the varying dispute system
Id. (citations omitted).
137 The American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution has recommended
that court programs collect ten basic kinds of data systematically; this would permit
better comparisons across varying dispute system designs. See Memorandum from Am.
Bar Ass'n Section of Dispute Resolution Task Force on Research and Statistics (Oct. 11,
2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR014500, follow
"Top Ten Data Fields for Court Programs" hyperlink under "Related Resources" (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009). This site also contains the section's selected bibliography on
Court ADR resources.
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designs in use across the federal courts. We could learn how to make ADR
programs better. 138 We owe it to the public to work toward this goal.
138 For suggestions on how, see Gregory Todd Jones, Fighting Capitulation: A
Research Agenda for the Future of Dispute Resolution, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 277 (2003)
(outlining an ambitious multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research agenda for the
field of dispute resolution).
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